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Members of the unit are already engaged in research projects related to the Centre activities. Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni's recent work "When the Union Hurts the Workers: a Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy", will be presented at the 2005 ESPE meeting to be held in Paris. Francesca Barigozzi, whose main research interests are in health and information economics, will present the paper "A Rationale for Seaching (Imprecise) Health Information" at the forthcoming 2005 PET conference in Marseille and at the Conference in tribute to Jean-Jacques Laffont to be held in Toulouse in July 2005. Daniele Fabbri and Chiara Monfardin paper "Price elasticity, income and the demand for physician visits" will be presented at the forthcoming Child Meeting in Bari and at the 5th World Congress of the International Health Economics Association to be held in Barcelona. Chiara Monfardini's recent paper "Women's Employment, Children and Transition: and Empirical Analysis on Poland", coauthored with Elena Bardasi (World Bank), appeared as a Child Working Paper (07/05). Carlo Mazzaferro has developed a microsimulation dynamic model to study the distributive impact of pension reforms in Italy which will be also presented at the CHILD annual meeting in Bari. Claudio Zoli's recent research projects focus on the measurement of inequality, poverty and welfare with qualitative data, and on the multidimensional measurement of poverty. Recent works include the Child Working Paper (01/05) "Sequential procedures for poverty gap dominance" (with Peter J. Lambert). In the spring of 2005, CHILD joined the European project WOLIWEB that aims to expand the Dutch web-based Wage Indicator Questionnaire to nine countries, including Italy. The project aims to study perceptions of pay discrimination by gender or ethnicity in relation to any factual pay gap, preferences for more or fewer working hours in relation to working hours and household duties. In June 2005 Oxford University Press published two books edited by Child members. The first is European Women at work: an Economic Perspective (edited by D. Del Boca, with T. Boeri and C. Pissarides) which has contributions of several other child members (Aaberge, Colombino, Pasqua, Ermisch, Francesconi, Strom). In July, The Economics of Child Labour by Alessandro Cigno (Florence) and Furio Rosati (Tor Vergata). The book is a mix of theory, econometrics and policy discussion (see www.child-centre.it/books) Per un'analisi Critica del Mercato del Lavoro will be published by Il Mulino with the contribution of some CHILD members (M. Bratti and D. Vuri). The project "The Guaranteed Minimum Income: Evaluation and Simulations", supported by Compagnia di San Paolo, started in 2004 and coordinated by Ugo Colombino, has completed its first year. Some of the results of the research will be presented at the Conference Discrete Choice and Labour supply models at the University of Galway in December 2005. Members of the Verona unit (Sartor, Roveda and Polin) participated to the Conference on "Families, births and social policies" organised by the "Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei", Rome, April 28-29 2005 which concludes a project financed by the Italian Ministry of University and Research. Also in Verona, a series of invited lectures on "The Current Demographic and Fiscal Crisis in the Developed World" was held by Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Two new assistant professor, Martina Menon (from York) and Eugenio Peluso (from Cergy-Pontoise) both members of CHILD, joined the Faculty in Verona. Members of the Bari Unit and the Turin team will be involved from 2005 till 2007 in a joint project funded by MURST (COFIN) entitled "Economic aspects of international mobility of productions inputs". Maria Concetta Chiuri and Alessandra Venturini are organizing a joint AIEL-CHILD session on "the Economic Aspects of Migration" at the XX Annual Conference of the Italian Labour Economists Association to be held in Rome on 22nd-23rd September 2005. In July 2005, Franco Peracchi (CHILD Tor Vergata) will organise the fifth "Villa Mondragone Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics". This workshop offers a selected group of young researchers the opportunity to receive intense feedback on their work from more experienced economists. Finally in October 2005, an international conference "Interactions within the Family: Collective and Bargaining models", sponsored by CHILD, IZA, ZEW and NYU, and organized by Daniela Del Boca (with O. Bargain, D. Beninger and G. Violante), will be held in Turin.</p>
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
THE AGE OF DISCONTENT: ITALIAN HOUSEHOLDS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DECADE

Tito Boeri and Andrea Brandolini

Expressions* like “new poverty”, “household impoverishment”, “crisis of the middle class”, “the wage issue” have featured prominently, if unusually, in the recent public debate in Italy. There are at least four diverse dimensions in this debate. The first is the *macroeconomic* dimension, which is summarised by the concern for the “economic decline” of the country, i.e. the failure to keep up with the pace of growth experienced in the past. A second dimension is represented by changes in the *distribution of economic resources* in the form of a rise in income inequality, of higher poverty, or a disappearing middle class. The third dimension is also distributive, but it has to do more with future risks than past changes: the focus is on the increased *economic vulnerability* of Italian households. The fourth dimension goes beyond medium-run trends: it relates to *social mobility*, both intra- and inter-generational, and hints at a stiffening of social stratification.

These different themes are intertwined, often confused, in the public debate. However, this public concern is not a media hype. Italian households do perceive a deterioration of their own financial situation and of the economic conditions of the country since mid 1990s. More recently, their expectations about short- and medium-term prospects worsened significantly more than in other European countries. While the decline in expectations was common, in other EMU countries it was not as marked and pervasive as in Italy.

Income Inequality



Source: authors' calculations on SHIW data (Version 3.0). Vertical bars equal twice the standard error on both sides.


These trends are not matched by a rise of poverty and income inequality. On the basis of evidence from the Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), the concentration of disposable incomes rose sharply between 1991 and 1993, at the time of

the most severe recession experienced by Italy after the Second World War, but did not increase thereafter. Likewise, headcount poverty ratios did not show any upward trend, following the dramatic increase of the early 1990s: the relative measures remained stable, while the absolute ones declined.

Note that these observations focus on the *evolution* of income inequality over time, but are silent on its *level*. The degree of income inequality is in Italy among the highest in the EU, as shown by the most recent comparable statistics of the Luxembourg Income Study.

Low-Income Persons

(per cent of total population)



Source: authors' calculations on SHIW data (Version 3.0).

How can these negative perceptions be reconciled with a basic stability of the income distribution?

First, alternative data sources display a constancy or even a decline in poverty rates even when data cover up to 2003. Also adjustments to take into account unreported self-employed income or capital income do not point to a recent rise of income inequality and poverty. The discrepancy does not appear to arise from a measurement problem.

Second, the strong deceleration of output growth in the last decade jointly with fiscal consolidation and concerns about the long-term sustainability of public finance may have led Italians to drastically revise downwards their expectations of income growth.

Third, income distribution has shifted to the advantage of the households of self-employed, managers and retired persons, and to the disadvantage of the households of production and clerical workers (including school teachers). The different income dynamics affected group specific poverty ratios, although it did not show up in national measures of poverty. Using the relative line at 50 per cent of the median, the increase in relative poverty between 1993 and 2002 among the latter group of households (and that of non-employed non-retired heads) was more than compensated by the improved

condition of the households of the retired and the self-employed (the incidence among households headed by managers remained nil).

Decomposition of relative poverty by social group

(percentage points)



Source: authors' calculations on SHIW data (Version 3.0). The social group is defined by the labour market status of the household's head.

Fourth, in the last ten years income mobility rose both in relative and absolute terms. The Pearson correlation coefficient between each person's income levels in two subsequent waves declined from 0.77 in 1993-95 to 0.69 in 2000-02; the share of people remaining in the same income quintile group diminished from 55 to 50 per cent; the probability of falling from the second to the bottom quintile group increased from 20 to 26 per cent. Because of these changes, the Italian income mobility pattern has become more similar to that characterising Great Britain at the beginning of the 1990s. Increased job precariousness and income fluctuations associated with the holding of risky assets may have given rise to these tendencies, tuning down the perceived benefits of the decline in unemployment. Under stagnating incomes and risk aversion, greater uncertainty is likely to have reduced the well-being of individuals. These tendencies have made even more visible well-known deficiencies of our social protection system, such as the low coverage of unemployment benefits or the poor targeting properties of social transfers in comparison with other European countries.

None of these factors provides, by itself, a complete explanation. Taken together, however, they suggest an ongoing deep transformation of the Italian society – which is at the roots of the households' discontent.

* The views expressed are ours and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy.

QUALITY OF LIFE OF DISABLED PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES

Marco Carner and Federico Perali

A recent OECD Report entitled “Transforming Disability into Ability – Policies to Promote Work and Income Security for Disabled People” stresses the fact that the disabled should not be a person excluded from society, but must be encouraged to participate to the economic and social life favouring the access, when possible, to the labor market. On the other hand, those who cannot participate in the labor market should have a secure income guaranteeing a decent standard of living. The number of disabled people is increasing and live longer but the resources available to disabled people are not increasing proportionally.

Data limitations confine the analysis of the OECD report to the working conditions of the disabled persons but leaves the assessment of the standard of living of the disabled people aside. The costs of disability should describe changes in quality of living of disabled people and opportunity costs associated with the foregone income lost because of the reduction of a person’s capabilities and functionings. Further, there are costs associated with changes of standard of living of the family members taking care of the disabled person. There are also costs for the local community for the treatment of the disability and the assistance to the household. Society must know these different necessities and situations to be fair in deciding who should be the recipient of what, and how much should be transferred to households in exchange of the social service provided.

The needs of a disabled person vary substantially for each specific degree of limitation and subjective preferences. The measurement of the needs of disabled people can be undertaken extending the concept of equivalence scales defining the compensation to be given to the family hosting a disabled person to reach the same level of welfare of a normal family. Equivalence scales, though, do not take into account the value of time, differences in intensity of degree of disability, changes in the sharing rule governing the transfer of goods and time to the disabled, and other immaterial situations.

The measurement of the cost associated with the presence of a disabled person within the family reveals the limitations of both official statistics and economic theory. Official statistics define child poverty in terms

of the percentage of households with children below the poverty line. However, they do not help in determining how much poorer is a child with limited capabilities or how much poorer their families are. Economic theory, on the other hand, is much limited when comparing, for example, the living condition of a normal child in good health living in a poor household with both parents with the living conditions of a disabled child living in a rich household with a single parent.

The following example, which addresses the question whether a deaf person should receive a cochlear implant, may help clarifying some aspects of the decision-making problem implying the changes in standard of living for her/him and her/his family along with the associated costs for the community.

In Italy 7.8% of the population is ipo-acoustic and requires treatment. About 10% of this sub-population is less than 14 years old, while 62% is older than 65. About 8% of children have a severe or deep deafness accounting for an incidence of 200-300 deaf children per year. The hearing impairment also affects all functionings connected to the central nervous system such as the acoustic perception, the level of attention and memory, the space-time activity, the cognitive level, the linguistic expression, and the personality which is usually more diffident, aggressive, and introverted.

An ipo-acoustic problem is treated either with a prosthesis or a surgical implant of a cochlear ear. The decision is based on the costs borne by the public health system. Inspection of the table reveals that the cost of a cochlear implant, all included, is about three times the cost of a prosthesis. Long run costs, however, are about 1/3 of the prosthesis costs. From the regional administration’s point of view (Regions are in charge of the public health service), the traditional

prosthesis is preferable to the cochlear implant. But if Regions should also cover the actualized long run costs borne mainly by the central state through its national education system, then mainly cochlear implants would be financed.

The perspective of minimizing public administration costs, however, may or may not be in line with the objective of maximizing the standard of living of the individual. The person with an acoustic impairment, and the hosting family, is incomparably better off with a cochlear implant rather than with a prosthesis. The intangible benefits are, for example, the value of the benefits for a household now capable to communicate in the spoken language that the child has learned after the surgery; the value of the greater amount of leisure for the household members who were taking care of the disabled child; or the eudemonistic value for the parents to know that their son, previously suffering for a congenital malformation, for which they were feeling guilty, is now a normal person. Then, should health administrations choose between a prosthesis or a cochlear implant on the basis of the costs that they incur or of the treatment which maximizes the well-being of the disabled person and her/his family? The answer would be obvious, if there were adequate data about measuring the well-being of the person with limited capabilities and her/his family. Unfortunately, information in this respect in Italy is fragmentary and comes from surveys not specifically designed for the disabled sub-population. Also micro-data collected through the EU ECHP initiative report detailed information on incomes, employment, health conditions, education, and others, but not information on consumption data (and needs) which are fundamental to measure the quality of life. The ISTAT household budgets report information about consumption but insufficient information about the health status. It is of paramount importance that the Italian

Costs for the treatment (prosthesis or surgery) and recovery

Short and Long Run Costs (€)	Traditional Prosthesis (TP)	Cochlear Implant (CI)	IC/TP
Short run costs: <i>Prosthesis-Vibrator, Upgrade, Batteries - €</i>	12650	37261	2.94
Long run costs: <i>Logopedic Re-education, Support Teacher, Frequency Indemnity</i>	194686	59946	1/3

REGIONAL DISPARITIES AND INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE CASE OF ITALY

D. Checchi and Vito Peragine

The opportunity egalitarian theory of justice has been discussed and defended by a number of scholars in recent years, both in the area of political philosophy and normative economics (Dworkin, 1981, Fleurbaey, 1995, Roemer, 1998). The appealing feature of the equality of opportunity view is that it offers a version of egalitarianism which does not deny individual responsibility. For this reason, it is argued, equality of opportunity is the prevailing conception of social justice in western liberal democracies (Roemer, 1998). In fact, the opportunity egalitarian view combines features of libertarianism and egalitarianism. From the former it borrows the requirement that public policies should be neutral with respect to outcome inequalities caused by factors that are within the individuals' control (effort, for short). But, out of egalitarian inspiration, it requires a public intervention in order to eliminate inequalities due to factors that are beyond the control of people (social circumstances). This theory poses two different economic issues: the first is the design of a public policy intended to implement the opportunity egalitarian view (see on this Roemer et al. 2001); the second is the problem of measuring the degree of opportunity inequality in society. In a recent working paper (Checchi and Peragine, 2005, available at <http://www.economia.unimi.it/chechchi/pdf/un27.pdf>) we address the latter issue by proposing a methodology to measure opportunity inequality and to decompose overall inequality in an "ethically offensive" and an "ethically acceptable" part. In addition, we provide an empirical application of these new evaluation tools, and we show how they compare with standard distributional analysis.

The strategy we propose is the following. We have an income distribution, where each individual income is causally determined by two classes of factors: circumstances and effort. We assume observability of a person's circumstances, but not of her effort. To cope with this informational constraint, we first partition the population into types, a type being a group of people with the same level of circumstances. Then, by assuming an income function which, for any given level of circumstances, is monotonically increasing in effort, we obtain Roemer's "statistical solution": people in different types have exercised a comparable degree of effort if they are at the same rank of their own type income distribution. Within this framework, we can interpret the income differences within a given tranche (i.e., the group of people at the same rank of their respective type distributions) as inequality due to different opportunities. On the other hand, differences between the tranches only represent the different reward due to individual effort. Thus the problem of ethical decomposition of inequality becomes

similar to the problem of decomposition of inequality by population subgroups.

In the empirical application we compare two Italian macroregions (North and South) on the basis of equality of opportunity. We draw data on individual annual earnings and family background from the Survey on the Income and Wealth of Italian Households (SHIW), waves 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000. We have restricted the sample to observations with positive earnings from dependent employment (given the low reliability of self-declared incomes from self-employed). The survey asks for net earnings; based on existing fiscal laws and information about family composition, we have reconstructed the gross earnings. Circumstances are represented in our work by family backgrounds, which in turn is measured by the highest educational attainment in the couple of parents. Since individual earnings varies according to many other observable characteristics that we want to ignore (like gender or age), we have regressed actual gross earnings on some controls (gender, experience and experienced squared, survey years) and we have taken the residuals from this regression. But data are still "contaminated" by unobservable components (like ability or luck) that may confound the analysis of inequality. Under the maintained assumption that individuals at the same percentile of earning distribution have exerted the same degree of effort, we have partitioned the earnings distribution (conditional on parental background) into 20 quantiles, and we have replaced individual (predicted) income with the average income of each cell (20 quantiles \times 5 types of background). The reduction in measured earnings inequality is rather limited.


We are now in the condition of analysing two earnings distributions, in the North and in the Centre-South, according to two characteristics, parental education and individual effort, having dispensed for individual heterogeneity and unobservable components.

The main results of our analysis are the following. The inequality of income attributable to inequality of opportunity is

equal to 0.0079 in Center-South and 0.0038 in North (log mean standard deviation). Therefore the inequality of opportunity is double in Southern regions; moreover, the gap is concentrated in lowest percentiles (with reversed situation in upper percentiles - see figure 1). When we consider the inequality of income attributable to inequality of responsibility/effort, we calculate the inequality index between tranches for each region, obtaining respectively a measure of 0.073 in Center-South and 0.061 in North. Since effort inequality is in the same order of magnitude between regions, whereas inequality of opportunity was double in the Center-South, as a consequence inequality of opportunity accounts for 1/10 of earnings inequality in Southern regions and just 1/20 in Northern ones. This is consistent with finding less mobility in South than in the North of Italy, even if it exhibit a converging trend. As long as parental education reduces its impact onto educational attainment of younger cohorts, the benefits in terms of inequality reduction will accrue more to the South than to the North.

Unsurprisingly, our results are consistent with standard regression analysis. When parental education is measured by dummy variables, we find that they bear a coefficient which is almost double in the South than in the North when we exclude the educational attainment of the individual, whereas it goes up to three-four times when the educational attainment is included. This regression helps us to understand why the inequality of opportunity is higher in the South: while most of the parental background exerts its effect through favouring the educational attainment of the children in the North, it keeps on playing a role independently from education in the South. This could represent the impact that family networking play in finding good jobs. But it could also be related to the social capital: since parental background is correlated with the average educational attainment of the environment, the positive effect of parental education (once we control for educational attainment of the child) could also represent a sort of "peer effect" during the educational career, that later on manifests itself in higher earnings.

Figure 1 – Inequality of opportunity by macro regions – Italy 1993-2000



SEX, POWER AND REPUTATION: WHICH POLICIES ABOUT PROSTITUTION?

Marina Della Giusta, Maria Laura Di Tommaso and Steinar Strøm

Both the literature and currently available data describe prostitution as a multi-million industry mobilising internationally millions of workers, regulated in widely different ways. Some stylised facts are as follows. As regards supply, this is an activity mostly entered for economic reasons, done largely but not exclusively by women. Supply and working conditions depend partly on the availability of other livelihood opportunities (not just other jobs and their pay, but also the working conditions) and partly on social stigma. Criminalisation and social stigma make this a high-risk activity for prostitutes (violence and health risk). Evidence suggests that the ability to maintain emotional detachment and separate one's identity of prostitute from one's other identities are skills, and skills are required (and developed on the job) to defend themselves and cope with risks, given the occurrence of violence against prostitutes is widespread and often little protection is offered by institutions. As argued by Nussbaum (1999), prostitution does require skills, but different from the ones we are used to measuring. Both men (the vast majority) and women demand prostitution services. What emerges from interviews with clients is that they demand 'control of sex' for money, rather than, as conventionally believed, 'sex' for money. Studies that contain interviews with clients also suggest that the demand is underpinned by ideas of control and subjugation supported by patriarchy and racism, which provide an entitlement to use prostitutes by stigmatising them as inferior. These same systems (patriarchy, racism, classism) provide mechanisms for a partial subversion of the stigmatisation, so that both prostitutes and clients describe themselves as in control of the relationship.

Prostitution is also a highly fragmented industry divided in different sub-markets, and characterised by the presence of

different types of intermediaries, which play a particularly important role, ranging from more to less exploitative (examples of trafficking and nuances of it at one end self managed prostitutes, including trade unions at the other), and appear to differ in the different sub-markets.

To model prostitution taking into account social stigma, a forthcoming CHILD working paper develops a model which explicitly includes reputation in agents' preferences. This affects their choices as much as do economic outcomes. Agents' utility is therefore defined on consumption (which will in turn be a function of their income and other characteristics) and on reputation, both desired per-se and used to access other earning opportunities. Stigma coincides with loss of reputation, which can affect pay and working conditions and access to other jobs for prostitutes, and can affect clients similarly. We also allow for agents to have a different concern for their reputation depending on their personal characteristics and the specific moment at which they exercise choice.

Clients' utility depends on the amount of commercial sex bought, on the consumption of ordinary goods, and reputation. Prostitutes' utility depends on leisure, consumption of ordinary goods, and reputation. We maximise clients' utility with respect to a budget and a reputation constraint, and obtain the marginal willingness to pay for commercial sex in terms of consumption of other goods and reputation loss. Analogously, for prostitutes we obtain the shadow price of leisure time in terms of the net gain of supplying commercial sex. We then assign a specific functional form to utility and derive a demand and a supply functions through which we obtain the market equilibrium, which through manipulation of the parameters can be applied to describe different sub-

markets in the prostitution industry. The model allows simulating the effect of different policies for prostitution. For example policies that recognise prostitution as a job and reduce the stigma associated with it, will have the effect of increasing the marginal net gain of supplying commercial sex, and increase the marginal willingness to pay for commercial sex. This should, in a closed economy, have the effect of increasing the price of commercial sex and, given the same availability of alternative earning opportunities and if there are constant intermediation margins, also increase the supply. However, in an open economy there always is immigration of illegal workers and out-migration of clients (sex tourism), which would help keeping prices low.

Another example is that of policies that increase the stigma of being clients, which have been used in the case of street prostitution where the latter is illegal, in the expectation that this would reduce supply in this market. According to our framework, this reduces the marginal willingness to pay for commercial sex and not the quantity of commercial sex demanded, and will therefore imply that clients will try to reduce the risk of being caught or negotiate lower prices, rather than reducing their demand.

Clearly the effect of policies greatly depends on the particular segment of the industry that is being addressed, and our model allows the description of up to 32 different markets within the prostitution industry, depending on clients' reputation and their concern for it, and prostitutes' employment alternatives, their reputation and their concern for it. In our view, given the present diversity of prostitution policies taking place across several countries, it is important to unify many issues that have so far remained formally unconnected in economic analysis, which hopefully will attract more economists to produce work that can be usefully applied to policy formulation.

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CHILD 04/2005	The Persistent Segregation of Girls into Lower-Paying Jobs while in School P. Kooreman
CHILD 03/2005	Deprivation and Social Exclusion W. Bossert, C. D'Ambrosio and V. Peragine
CHILD 02/2005	Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods V. Lechene and I. Preston
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Books

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- » John Ermisch (ISER, University of Essex)
- » Christopher Flinn (New York University)
- » Marco Francesconi (ISER, University of Essex)
- » Reuben Gronau (Hebrew University, Jerusalem)
- » Stephen P. Jenkins (ISER, University of Essex)
- » Wilbert van der Klaauw (University of North Carolina)
- » Peter Kooreman (University of Groningen)
- » Valerie Lechene (University of Oxford)
- » Marco Manacorda (CEP and LSE)
- » Enrico Moretti (UCLA, Department of Economics)
- » Nicola Pavoni (UCL and Carlos III, Madrid)
- » Ray Rees (University of Munich)
- » Rocio Ribero (Universidad de los Andes, Bogota)
- » Paul T. Schultz (Yale University)
- » Alain Trannoy (University of Cergy - Pontoise)
- » Kenneth I. Wolpin (University of Pennsylvania)
- » Klaus F. Zimmermann (IZA and Bonn University)

Seminars and Conferences 2005

June
2005, 10

SEMINARS

David Ribar (The George Washington University)
“Breaking Up the Empty Nest: Effects of Marital Dissolution on Grown Children”
 (with Julie Becher)
 Department of Economics, University of Turin, Via Po 53

April
2005, 26

Christopher Flinn (New York University and Child)
“Child Investment over Marital States”
 Department of Economics, University of Turin, Via Po 53

October
2005, 28-29

CONFERENCES

Interactions within the Family: Collective and Bargaining models
 CHILD, IZA, ZEW, NYU, organized by D. Del Boca (with O. Bargain,
 D. Beninger and G. Violante), University of Turin.

September
2005, 22-23

XX National Conference of Labour Economics
 Facoltà di Economia - Università di Roma "La Sapienza"
The economic aspects of migration
 Joint Session of AIEL and CHILD,
 co-ordinated by M. C. Chiuri and A. Venturini

July
2005, 08

2005 Child Annual Workshop
Advancements in Population Economics
 Maria Concetta Chiuri organizer
 University of Bari

March
2005, 04-05

The Rationale of Parenthood Choices
 MoCho Conference
 Jacques Le Cacheux (organizer)
 Université de Pau (France)