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## PRESENTATION

The activity of the Centre has continued during the last year. In October 2005, an international conference "Interactions within the Family: Collective and Bargaining models", sponsored by CHILD, IZA, ZEW and NYU, and organized by D. Del Boca, O. Bargain, D. Beninger and G. Violante, was held in Turin. In March 2006, a joint NFR-CHILD workshop on "Evaluation of Tax and Social Policies", organized by U. Colombino, was held in Moncalieri (Turin). In April, D. Del Boca and G. Devetag organized with the Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America at Columbia University in New York a workshop on "Social Economics: Market Behavior in a Social Context". A workshop on "The Economics of Diversity, Migration, and Culture" was held in Bologna by G. Bertocchi and G. Ottaviano (CHILD Bologna). G. Bellettini co-organizes the 5th Workshop on "Macroeconomic Dynamics: Theory and Applications", to be held in December 2006. C. Zoli (CHILD Bologna) co-organizes the January 2007 International Doctorate Winter School on "Risk and Inequality". In January 2006, E. Peluso and F. Perali (CHILD Verona) organized the first winter School on "Inequality and Collective Welfare Theory (IT1): Population Ethics, Inequality and Redistribution". In June 2006 the annual European Society for Population Economics (ESPE) congress took place in Verona. F. Perali, G.P. Cipriani, M. Menon and E. Peluso served as local organizers. F. Perali and G.P. Cipriani also organized, in July 2006, the first Summer School on "Inequality, Poverty and Development: The Role of Markets and Institutions" in Alba di Canazei (Trento). F. Peracchi (CHILD Tor Vergata) and C. Flinn (New York University and CHILD) are among the organizers of the sixth "Villa Mondragone Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics" held in July 2006.

CHILD is still involved in the European project WOLIWEB, started in 2005, that aims to expand the Dutch web-based

Wage Indicator Questionnaire to nine countries, including Italy, on perceptions of pay discrimination by gender or ethnicity. The project "The Guaranteed Minimum Income: Evaluation and Simulations", supported by Compagnia di San Paolo and coordinated by U. Colombino (CHILD Turin), started in 2004 and is now in its second year. A workshop on the results will be held next Spring.

The project "Transnationality of Migrants: Enduring Ties with the Home Country and Integration in the Host Country" has been approved as part of the Human Resources and Mobility (HRM) Activity and of the Marie Curie Actions (RTN). A. Venturini (CHILD Turin) is one of the partners of the project, which will last 3 years. The project "The Economic Effect of International Mobility of Production Factors" directed by R. Faini and financed by the Italian Ministry for University and Research is at his second and last year. The network includes several CHILD members of the Bari, Rome and Turin units. G. Bertocchi (CHILD Modena) participates in the research "Migration, Growth, and Institutions", funded by the Italian Ministry for University and Research. Within the project on "International fragmentation of production of Italian firms and the role of information technologies", funded by the Italian Ministry for

University and Research in 2005 and lasting till 2008, researchers from the Bari unit, coordinated by G. Ferri, provide new evidence supporting the migration-trade link. Also D. Vuri (CHILD Tor Vergata) participates to this research. A. Cigno and A. Luporini (CHILD Florence) have continued work on the Economics of Universities and on their project on the Economics of the Family, concerned with intergenerational cooperation. Members of CHILD Tor Vergata participated or promoted several research project in 2006: "Cohort unemployment in Europe" funded by Eurostat (F. Peracchi, M. Manacorda and M. Guelli); "Effectiveness of tax credit to favor new hiring" (F. Peracchi and D. Vuri), Italian Ministry for Economy and Finance; "Distance to school and children school enrolment in Ghana", World Bank (F.C. Rosati and D. Vuri); "Gender gap in wage growth during the first career years in Italy", Italian Ministry for University and Research (D. Vuri - with E. Del Bono, University of Essex).

Research grants received by members of the Verona CHILD unit include projects on "Juvenile Crime: Causality and Evaluation of Policy Interventions at the Individual and Social Level," and "Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Rehabilitative Model for Patients with Skull Trauma".



## THE PUBLIC PROVISION OF HEALTHCARE IN THE PRESENCE OF PRIVATE SUPPLEMENTS

**Daniele Fabbri and Chiara Monfardini**

In several OECD countries, like Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom, healthcare is mainly provided by the State and financed out of tax revenue or social insurance contributions. At the same time in these countries, there exists a market providing supplementary or substitutable private healthcare. Public healthcare services are a clear example of public provision of a private good. In a first-best world, there is no reason for such a public provision. But first-best reasoning can be misleading in a second-best setting, in particular when there are limits to redistributive policy. In this context instruments that help to sort income classes become useful. As first suggested by Nichols and Zeckhauser (1984), public provision can work as such a sorting device if low income citizens choose the publicly provided good, while high income citizens opt out to the private. The latter contribute to public revenue through income taxation, which is then used to subsidize the delivery of the private good to the former. In order for self-selection to take place, it is crucial that the publicly and privately provided goods are good substitutes for low income people, but poor substitutes for high income people. In healthcare, the quality of the treatment itself and the waiting time to have it delivered, are "normal" attributes for which richer people have a higher willingness to pay than poorer people. It is therefore to be presumed that the above property is satisfied. Despite its relevance, little empirical evidence is available about the substitution between publicly and privately provided healthcare.

In a recent CHILD working paper (Fabbri-Monfardini 2006, "Rationing the public provision of healthcare in the presence of private supplements: evidence from the Italian NHS") we contribute to this literature by providing the first empirical assessment of the relative and joint effectiveness of user charges and administrative waiting time in curbing the demand for public physician care while accounting for the presence of imperfect substitutes available in the market. We work on data coming from a national household survey conducted by the Italian National Statistical Institute: the "Indagine Statistica Multiscopo sulle Famiglie: condizioni di salute e ricorso ai servizi sanitari" (1999-2000).

The demand for physician care in Italy refers to three alternatives: primary care and public and private specialists consultations. Each demand component is proxied by the corresponding number of visits (counts) sought by the individual in the four weeks before the interview. We model the three visits counts jointly, as if they were part of an incomplete system of demand, with

a complete vector of prices and waiting times entering among the regressors of each equation. By exploiting territorial variation in waiting times and fees we are able to measure own and cross elasticities for each demand component. According to our evidence the demand for public healthcare, GP and specialist visits, does not depend on household income. On the other hand, the demand for private healthcare increases with income and the propensity to hold a private insurance. Therefore the Italian NHS does not seem to operate any redistribution through self-selection and opting out of the richer.

It provides a basic package consumed by the whole population, to be supplemented with an imperfect

increase in waiting time. Marginal consumers of a private visit (i.e. those expecting the lower health gain from it) are not discouraged at all by a fee increase (as measured in our sample) but can be discouraged by an increase in waiting time. At the same time, we measure no significant cross-price and cross-waiting effect. This evidence is coherent with a consumer expecting small health gain from the public visit. Thus, marginal consumer of public visits displaced by a fee or a waiting time increase do not value the lost visit enough to switch to the private.

The same effect prevails also for marginal consumers of private visits displaced by an increase in waiting time.

**Table 1: Territorial gradient in avg. visit counts, nominal and real monetary aggregates (fees and income).**

	N-West	N-East	Centre	South	Islands	ITALY
<b>GP visits</b>	0.254	0.278	0.293	0.335	0.313	0.296
<b>Publ.Sp. visits</b>	0.093	0.114	0.111	0.108	0.142	0.111
<b>Priv.Sp. visits</b>	0.075	0.080	0.089	0.082	0.073	0.080
<b>Public fee*</b>	19.651	23.083	21.197	18.147	15.386	19.833
<b>Private fee</b>	80.508	78.863	70.946	70.089	67.108	73.772
<b>Income</b>	1.384	1.425	1.304	0.950	0.903	1.200
<b>WAIT PUB</b>	1.833	2.616	1.769	1.345	1.776	1.826
<b>WAIT PRI</b>	0.842	1.102	0.956	0.701	0.832	0.878

All monetary values are denominated in EU €. \* These aggregates refer to average fees for NONEXEMPT individuals. \*\* Source: our elaboration on data from the Bank of Italy.

**Table 2: Price and waiting time elasticities across percentiles (robust standard errors in parentheses).**

	GP visits	Public Specialist visits	Private Specialist visits
<b>FEE PUB</b>	-0.026 (0.097)	-0.307*** (0.125)	0.110 (0.132)
<b>FEE PRI</b>	-0.046 (0.125)	0.065 (0.193)	0.124 (0.202)
<b>WAIT PUB</b>	0.050* (0.031)	-0.044* (0.030)	-0.004 (0.039)
<b>WAIT PRI</b>	-0.009 (0.037)	0.004 (0.062)	-0.119** (0.053)

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Elasticities and their standard errors are evaluated at the median level of each variables according to (6). For public visits median values refer to non exempt individuals.

substitute available in the market, more frequently by the richer and the privately insured.

We find that own price elasticity of the demand for public specialist consultation is about -.3. Administrative waiting time prove to play a less relevant role as a rationing tool. No substitution seems to exist between the demand for public and private specialist so that user charges act as a net deterrent for over-consumption. Our results suggest that marginal consumers of public visits are more discouraged by a fee increase than by an

This suggests that rationing public provision with moderate waiting lists and low user charges is rather effective in curbing demand.

They make consumption less attractive to marginal consumers valuing expected health gains from public and private visits less than the full cost of obtaining them. We do not find any evidence in support of the view that displaced marginal consumers are the richer so that user charges and waiting list cannot be claimed to reach redistributive aims.

## DO FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS HELP WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT? THE CASE OF INDIAN MOTHERS

### Gianna Claudia Giannelli and Francesca Francavilla

Much of the literature on female participation to the labor market in developing countries focuses on the conflict between maternal employment and women's family roles. It is argued, in particular for South Asian societies, that women's participation in income generating activities external to the family results in poor health outcomes and higher mortality for the children. This focus on women reproductive role and child welfare persistently conflicts with the efforts to promote greater labor market female involvement. The social preference for limiting women's activities to the domestic sphere, however, is often overridden by economic necessity, and poorer women are sometime more likely to be employed than richer women.

By contrast, other studies show that the greater the mothers' control over family resources, the greater their children welfare level. These observations have led the international institutions, e.g. the World Bank, to a strong recommendation for increasing women's participation in the market, as a key strategy to reduce fertility and mortality and improve nutrition.

As far as economic policies are concerned, national programs in favour of female employment have tended to preserve the women's domestic role promoting occupations in traditional skills, home-based and part-time work. These programs have not yielded many results in terms of better jobs and earnings opportunities for women.

Our argument is that, at the present stage of development, demographic and health programs have proven to be more effective for women's position in the society than specific labour and educational policies.

Our focus is on the effects of family planning (FP), reproductive and child care programs implemented in India, in particular since 1996, a year of radical transformations in population-related policies. We choose this country because it has a long standing and, by now, consolidated tradition in demographic policies. Moreover, we exploit the fact that Indian states have a considerable degree of political and policy autonomy, resulting in a large variation of institutional environments with which the nationwide demographic

policy interacts.

The micro data we use for our research are drawn from the National Health Family Survey, 1998-1999 (NFHS2). We also use aggregate data for some States newly released from the 2005-2006 survey (NHFS3, micro data are not available yet). The success of FP programs in our period of analysis is particularly evident in States with demographic and social indicators below the Indian average. Taking as an example one of the most underdeveloped States, Uttar Pradesh, in 2005, 53 percent of women aged 20-24 were married by age 18, an indicator that was equal to 64 percent in the 1998-1999 survey. In the same period, the total fertility rate has dropped from 4.06 to 3.82 and the median age at first birth has increased from 18.8 to 19.4 years. The percentage of married women with two living children wanting no more children has risen from 45 to 64. As far as maternal and reproductive health is concerned, antenatal care has increased from 35 to 67 percent of births in the preceding three years, 29 to 64 in rural areas. This fact, together with the increase in institutional deliveries has led to a decrease in infant mortality from 89 to 73 per 1000 births in the past five years.

Having assessed the relevance of FP in relaxing the burden of women's reproductive and health care roles, we ask whether there is any evidence of a positive impact of these programs on women's position in the labour market. Using micro data drawn from NHFS2 for some Indian States, we focus on the relation between FP programs and women's employment probability.

As an indicator of the exposition to FP programs we use the number of visits from an FP worker received by the woman in the last twelve months. 13 percent of women aged 15-49 received at least one visit (and, among them, three on average) which is an impressive result considering the huge Indian population. This indicator is exogenous to women's choices, depending on the coverage strategy of each State. In fact, the data show that differentials in home visits by background characteristics are generally small. During these contacts the FP worker monitors various aspects of the health of women and children, provides information related to health and family


planning and to the supply of public services, counsels and motivates women to adopt appropriate health and family planning practices.

Turning to female employment, we distinguish between rural and urban areas, in line with the literature on developing countries. In India, the employment probability is lower in urban (26%) than in rural areas (44%), where women mostly work as agricultural employees or self-employed labourers (see Figures 1 and 2), being often exploited in terms of earnings and working times.


We illustrate, as an example of our results, the logit coefficients of the probability of employment in Antra Pradesh, a big state of South India where, like in most Indian states, the main employment opportunity for females is in the agricultural sector. We focus on the results for the FP variable and education, even if the coefficients of the control variables show some differences between rural and urban residence that might be worth commenting.

Since unskilled agricultural labour represents the main employment opportunity, it is not surprising that female employment in rural areas is highly correlated with illiteracy (25 percentage points more in the probability of being employed). Instead, we do not find a significant correlation between illiteracy and employment in urban areas. This result might suggest that, in urban areas, a more equal distribution of job opportunities between skilled and unskilled occupations offers also decent earnings opportunities for females. In this context, the contact with an FP worker, providing essential information on how to improve family health and birth control also through the use of free public services, might have an impact on the labour market participation choice. Controlling for several demographic and family characteristics, our FP indicator turns out to be positively correlated with the probability of employment in urban areas. Each additional visit of the FP worker increases the probability of employment by 2.3 percentage points while, in rural areas, this indicator is not significant, a result that may support our hypothesis. The FP programs help to improve women's position in the labour market, but only where some decent employment opportunities exist.

**Fig. 1 Employment Status of Women in Urban Areas**



**Fig. 2 Employment Status of Women in Rural Areas**



## INTENTIONS TO RETURN OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS: ILLEGALITY AS A CAUSE OF SKILL WASTE

Nicola Coniglio, Giuseppe De Arcangelis and Laura Serlenga

The debate on illegal (or undocumented) migration in the developed world is capturing a great deal of public attention. The mounting dimension of the phenomenon is a direct consequence of the tightening of immigration laws in most OECD countries. In fact, these policies rather than reducing the size of immigration flows seem to have shifted the balance from legal to illegal migration. Recent estimates show an annual net inflow of 500,000 illegal immigrants to the US between 2002 and 2004 and a stock of about 11 million in March 2005. Estimates of illegal migration flows to Europe (EU-15) in 2001 are up to 650,000 (100,000 of them in Italy).

This shift from legal to illegal migration is not neutral and has an economic impact on many dimensions and for all the stakeholders involved (the migrants themselves, their countries of origin and the countries of destination). In a recent working paper (Coniglio, De Arcangelis and Serlenga, IZA Discussion Paper n. 2356, October 2006) we focus on how the status of migrants (illegal vs. legal) plays a role in the decisions to return home and how this affects differently skilled and unskilled illegal migrants.

The starting point is indeed the stark difference between undocumented and legal migrants. As generally acknowledged, although one of the most common motives for migration is the necessity to accumulate assets (which will be subsequently employed in productive activities), an illegal entrant is generally less capable of fully exploiting her skills and human capital. Moreover, the illegal status hinders the migrant's access to goods and services in the host country (including financial institutions for savings and remittance), which are instead fully available to legal migrants. Being illegal may make individual skills even less effective than in the home country, as the illegal migrant has to resort uniquely to the shadow economy. In other words,



illegality causes a skill waste, i.e. a considerable fraction of individual skills are left unused (wasted) because of illegality.

In a life-cycle two-period framework it is easy to link the skill endowment of an illegal migrant to his/her return decision. When the skill waste associated to the status of illegal migrant acts as a proportional tax that reduces the rate of return on skills in the destination country, then the more skilled the migrants, the higher the cost of working illegally in the destination country rather than going back home (where the normal salary is lower than in the destination country). In our model in the first period the migrant works in the destination country and is fully affected by the skill waste. At the end of the first period the migrant has to decide whether to stay in the destination country in the next period facing a positive probability of obtaining legal status, or whether to return to the origin country without paying the cost of illegality on his/her skills. This decision will affect also the rate of return on his/her savings in the first period. Those savings are subject to skill waste in the destination country, whereas they could obtain full return in the origin country (where they are likely to be employed in entrepreneurial activities whose returns are highly dependent on individual skills). It is easy to show that under general conditions, as a consequence of the skill waste due to illegality, the highly skilled illegal migrants are more likely to go back home than the low-skilled. The main prediction of our simple model is confirmed by the data. When considering the intentions to return of a representative sample of 920 illegal migrants who crossed the Italian borders in 2003 (see Chiuri, De Arcangelis, D'Uggento and Ferri, 2006, forthcoming as CHILD Working Paper for a description of the "Survey of Illegal Migration in Italy") we find empirical support for a higher

probability of return of the more skilled and educated migrants.

Using different measures of skills from our sample (as well as other control variables), intentions to return are positively related to all of them. As shown in the two figures below these predictions are confirmed even by looking at simply univariate relations. Interestingly, we also find that the presence of a migration network lessened the skill waste effect.

Since migration flows have proved to be unavoidable, the main message of this paper pinpoints the need to carefully design new immigration policies. Strict immigration policies generate illegal migration rather than stopping the flows. Illegality is costly for all parties involved: it reduces the economic return for the migrants, the development effects of migration for the countries of origin and the contribution of migrants to the host country economy. In particular, it ought to be considered that a generic ban is not neutral but it is likely to create a mis-allocation of human capital.



Source: Survey of Illegal Migration in Italy

## Working Papers 2006

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- » Nicola Pavoni (UCL and Carlos III, Madrid)
- » Ray Rees (University of Munich)
- » Rocio Ribero (Universidad de los Andes, Bogota)
- » Paul T. Schultz (Yale University)
- » Alain Trannoy (University of Cergy - Pontoise)
- » Kenneth I. Wolpin (University of Pennsylvania)
- » Klaus F. Zimmermann (IZA and Bonn University)

## Seminars and Conferences 2006

<b>27/09/2006</b>	CHILD & Collegio Carlo Alberto <b>"Life Cycle Employment and Fertility across Institutional Environments"</b> <i>Robert M. Sauer (University of Southampton and ICER)</i> Sala Gialla Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto, Via Collegio Reale 30, Moncalieri (TO)
<b>28/11/2006</b>	Workshop on <b>Famiglie in cerca di un Welfare</b> Real Collegio, 28 November, 2006 - Moncalieri (TO), Italy
<b>22/06/2006</b>	XX Annual Conference of the <b>European Society of Population Economics</b> ESPE2006, 22 - 24 June, 2006 - Verona, Italy
<b>21/04/2006</b>	Workshop on <b>SOCIAL ECONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT</b> Friday, April 21, 2006 - 1161 Amsterdam Avenue (116/118 Streets), New York Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America at Columbia University
<b>24/03/2006</b>	NFR - CHILD Workshop, 24-25 March 2006 <b>"Evaluation of Tax and Social Policies"</b> Fondazione Real Collegio, Via Real Collegio 30, Moncalieri
<b>15/03/2006</b>	Child-Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto Tito Boeri (Bocconi) <b>"Does Information increase Political Support for Pension Reform?"</b> Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto, Via Collegio Reale 30, Moncalieri (TO),
<b>22/02/2006</b>	Alessandro Cigno (CHILD, Florence) and Furio C. Rosati (CHILD, Tor Vergata) will present their new book <b>THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD LABOUR</b> <b>Oxford University Press, 2005</b> Discussants: Carlotta Berti Ceroni (CHILD, Bologna), Andrea Cornia (CHILD, Florence), Paola Gaeta (University of Florence) in room D15.005, Polo delle Scienze Sociali, University of Florence